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Large hydraulic projects have long been associated with the quest for 
power to transform landscapes, turning ‘deserts into gardens,’ and also the 
power to mobilise large numbers of people as part of a state’s assertion of its 
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sovereignty.1 The last hundred years in particular have been characterised by 
both colonial and post-colonial ‘hydraulic missions’ that pursued large-scale 
damming of river systems across the globe. Many large dams became syno-
nymous with nation-building and have sometimes served as icons for the life 
of entire generations.2 Dams have often contributed enormously to the gene-
ral welfare of citizens by broadening opportunities for food and cash crops 
been driven by the bureaucratic logic of institutions entrusted with hydraulic 
planning and water resources management, thus often becoming “ends in 
themselves, rather than a means to an end” symbolising state power (Molle 
et al., 2009, p. 328). On the other hand, citizens in Central Asia frequently 
face blackouts and shortage of affordable heating fuel.3 Electricity (and 
heating) provision in Tajik provinces can be as little as three hours a day in 
winter, when demand is high. Though statistics are not quite as bleak for 
Kyrgyzstani citizens, shortages and blackouts are regular occurrences, with 
particularly dark crises occurring in the winter of 2008-2009 and again in 
2014-2015.
This article investigates the history of big dams in Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, Rogun being our prime case study. The dam plans have 
generated differing international contacts in each country such as Russian 
investments in Kyrgyzstan, Iranian interest in Tajikistan, as well as diffe-
How do the two governments conceive of and talk about these projects to 
national and international audiences? Most importantly, the paper examines 
citizens’ relationships to ongoing dam projects on the Vakhš and Naryn 
rivers. How are citizens involved and/or affected ideologically, economi-
cally and politically by the projects?
Large dam projects are notorious for failing to deliver on their promised 
social, economic and environmental impact being regular features. Global 
anti-dam movements have widely mobilised public opinion and brought 
1 A classic, but also much disputed examination of the political role of water infrastructure 
is Karl Wittfogel’s thesis of ‘Oriental Despotism’ (1957).
2 The Nasserite High Aswan dam is a case in point (Mossallam, 2014).
3 For a wider discussion of ‘everyday energy politics’ in the region, see Féaux de la Croix 
& Gulette, 2014.
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attention to the catalogue of evils caused by “silencing the rivers” (McCully, 
2001). Despite the potentially negative impacts on citizens, in both countries 
surprising in the very constrained opportunities for freedom of opinion in 
Tajikistan, but it seems much more surprising in Kyrgyzstan: here, other 
natural resource exploitation projects – mining by foreign investors in par-
ticular – regularly provoke resistance at local and national level (Gullette 
& Kalybekova, 2014).4 Finally, the paper will attempt to establish whether 
and how the different natures of the Kyrgyzstani and Tajikistani govern-
ments affect dam politics, and their consequences for citizens.
Both relatively small in terms of territory and population, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan share similar geopolitical positions as the poorest of the 
post-Soviet republics, with more populous and resource-rich neighbours 
(Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan) and the ‘giant’ of China on their eastern border.5 
Both countries are highly dependent on subsistence agriculture on the one 
hand, and remittances from migrant workers, particularly in Russia, on the 
other.6 The ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan is affecting both countries 
Afghanistan, in the case of Kyrgyzstan, because it hosted a US airbase and 
agreement, until mid-2014. Beyond these similarities however, very signi-
go about hydropower projects. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have in the inde-
pendence period experienced very different political histories, Tajikistan 
most notably suffering a civil war, while Kyrgyzstan has coped with two 
periods of popular unrest and government overthrow. Both governments 
have periodically shifted degrees and kinds of economic control, co-option 
4 Further research is necessary to ascertain why exactly this is the case, and whether it 
with particular qualities and moral economies, and actors associated. Some aspects of this 
question are explored in Féaux de la Croix, Gullette & Wooden, forthcoming 2016.
5 Kyrgyzstan 5.6 and Tajikistan 8.4 million inhabitants respectively, both approximately the 
size of the UK, but much of the land mass uninhabited upper mountain reaches [www.data.
un.org, accessed 19.11.15].
6 Indeed, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have the sad honour of being the two countries most 
dependent on remittances in the world with 52 and 31% of GDP respectively, in 2012 (World 
Bank Migration and Development Brief 11.04.2014). 
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and censorship towards the population.7 For Tajikistan, some authors have 
construction (amongst other policies), and public opposition to Rogun was 
one factor fuelling the outbreak of the Tajik civil war (Schoeberlein, 2000; 
Sodiqov, 2009 & 2013). In Kyrgyzstan meanwhile, public protests over 
suddenly rising energy prices served as an important spark to the 2010 upri-
sing in Kyrgyzstan (Wooden, 2014).
Central Asia’s water politics are shaped by an uneven distribution of 
hydro-resources and different forms of political and economic power 
between upstream and downstream states. The two upstream countries of 
the region are united by their geographic position as the ‘water towers’ of 
Central Asia: fed by glaciers, both the Tajikistan’s Vakhš and Kyrgyzstan’s 
Naryn rivers are major tributaries to the Amu Darya and Syr Darya. These 
large rivers in turn form a water basin emptying into the Aral Sea. Dams on 
both rivers have played a role in the environmental disaster of the drastic 
shrinking of this sea, by allowing for river management schemes that diver-
8
Water and energy infrastructure projects in both countries have Soviet 
roots in the concepts and ambitious engineering plans that were developed 
from the thirties. -
nisation program, that included literacy and settlement campaigns, but 
also the supply of electricity, particularly through ambitious hydropower 
projects.9 In Tajikistan, the Nurek dam was completed in 1982, with fur-
ther dams immediately scheduled upstream (Daškevi  1974; Davidiânc & 
Tarasevi  1980; ernyš, 1981).
7 It would be very interesting to explore the roots of such differences in the Soviet and pre-
Soviet period, but this goes beyond the scope of this article.
8 The drying up of a large portion of the Aral Sea over the last half century has produced a 
in the glasnost era. For recent analyses see ICG, 2014; Jozan, 2012; Guenther & Loy, 2013.
9 For a comprehensive examination of Soviet hydropower and water infrastructure projects 
and their social and cultural context, see Gestwa, 2010. For histories of dam-building in 
Asia, see Féaux de la Croix, Bromber & Lange, 2014 or Nüsser, 2013.
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Nurek and Rogun lie on the Vakhš River, a major tributary of the Amu 
Darya, which is a central water artery for Uzbekistan, slicing through 
the West and allowing for cotton and other agricultural irrigation crops. 
Uzbek-Tajik relations have been consistently strained in other areas too, 
sometimes to breaking point at border crossings, over the ownership of 
fabled cities such as Bukhara and Samarkand, and the associated glorious 
history. These cities are now on Uzbekistani territory, with the majority 
of the population Tajik-speaking (Suyarkulova, 2011). Uzbekistan, in line 
with international recommendations on common river basin management, 
claims a say in upriver dam building, and fears that Rogun will mean both a 
2014). Tajikistan on the other hand claims that it is not even fully using 
its presently allocated water quota to these rivers, and that it is operating 
entirely within its rights, not disturbing the balance of water to the West and 
North at all.
Like the Toktogul cascade that came fully online in the mid-eighties 
in Kyrgyzstan, Nurek and associated dams supplied most of the country’s 
electricity needs. Further Soviet plans for large dam-building projects on 
the same rivers have been disinterred in the second decade of Kyrgyzstan’s 
and Tajikistan’s independence. The Tajikistani Rogun dam is the largest of 
these upstream projects now being attempted (predicted generating capacity 
of 3.6 MW). In Kyrgyzstan, Kambar Ata 2 is already feeding electricity into 
the grid, with the larger Kambar Ata 1 (1.9 MW production predicted) cur-
rently seeking investors. A further series of medium hydropower stations on 
the uppermost reaches of the Naryn were contracted to a Russian-Kyrgyz 
joint venture in 2013 and then planned to come online from 2019 onwards.
After outlining our research methodology and sketching the regional 
context of dam-building, we will discuss the late Soviet debates and dis-
courses over building Rogun. We then contrast these with discourses over 
the last decade. Current expert opinions in Dushanbe will be examined, 
as well as attitudes to the dam in Rogun, the town built for Soviet dam 
workers. Finally, we outline relevant aspects of the Naryn dams, before 
contrasting the two cases in our conclusion.
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comparative material discussed on the contemporary Naryn dam pro-
jects.10 Our comparison is based on joint ethnographic and archival work 
in summer 2014 as well as ongoing media analyses and previous mate-
rial on the topic gathered by both authors (Féaux de la Croix, 2010, 2011; 
Suyarkulova, 2011, 2014). In Dushanbe, we screened archives for news 
items and public-oriented literature on dam-building going back to the six-
ties (including school and university textbooks) and grey literature on the 
topic. We conducted a number of expert interviews, and spoke to citizens 
and workers in the town of Rogun (Roghun in Tajik) that was built for 
our research: we happened to visit Tajikistan just a few weeks after three 
people in Khorog, an important town on the Afghan border, were shot by 
response. Government agencies were very concerned with controlling the 
region, including access by foreign research teams to speaking with locals. 
During our stay, our Tajik colleague Alexander Sodiqov, who was wor-
king in Khorog for a British research team, was arrested and then charged 
with espionage. In this context, we needed to be very cautious about our 
own, but more importantly, about the safety of Tajik citizens who chose 
to engage with our research. Although we found a wide variety of people 
willing to speak to us on Rogun (always on condition of anonymity), we 
were forced to break off all contacts in the last few days, because of too 
much attention from local security services. In order not to endanger our 
informants, we avoided asking ordinary Tajik citizens directly about their 
opinion on Rogun, unless we had a well-established and trusting relation-
ship. We were not able to speak safely to people directly affected by resettle- 
ment programs.
Instead, we sought conversations with energy companies and ministries, 
water agencies and NGOs, as well as enquiring about the history of Rogun 
town. Repeated requests for literature and interviews with the ministry of 
down. Our nevertheless varied and very positive contacts with residents and 
10 A more detailed comparison can be made in conjunction with Féaux de la Croix, Gullette 
& Wooden, forthcoming 2016.
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dam workers were, however, cut short by unwelcome, but also predictable 
attention of the security services. For the same reason, we have in no way 
attempted a follow-up. These constraints and fears are, of course, telling on 
the nature of state surveillance and anxiety in the current context, but also 
11
For the Kyrgyzstani comparison, in 2014 Jeanne Féaux de la Croix 
repeatedly visited the Naryn region in Kyrgyzstan to work on a partici-
Dialogue and prior approval of the project was also sought with the ministry 
of Energy and Industry, the dam-building company RusHydro, as well as 
local state representatives. The project was carried out in the village on 
-
tion, and revealed a number of tensions and local concerns around water 
Our initial curiosity was to see in how far water infrastructure projects 
and state-society relations might be mutually constitutive. Consequently, 
however, it became apparent that no clear boundary between state and 
society could be drawn, as such categorisation follows a binary logic neither 
of us was comfortable with. Thus, for instance, John Heathershaw has 
argued convincingly that, rather than seeing the new states of the region as 
Weberian sense, they should be viewed as ‘global performance states’:
Such statehood is not fake – not a façade that conceals an underlying reality. 
However, it is not discernible if one insists on imposing dichotomies of state 
versus society, idea versus system, or inside versus outside. This performance 
and global statehood is perhaps particularly acute amongst postcolonial states 
that have only recently gained independence (Heathershaw, 2013, p. 32).
Further, it is important to underline that in each case, there are slightly 
different sets of actors involved (e.g. an aspiring government dynasty, in the 
case of Tajikistan’s president Rahmon), who are also able to act differently. 
Similarly, in each case, companies, international organisations and different 
clusters of citizens are involved in different ways. The divide between two 
11
articles on Rogun being removed, either by irresponsible library users or censors. There is 
no way of dating these interferences.
Jeanne FÉAUX DE LA CROIX and Mohira SUYARKULOVA110
-
tic to crystallise out of the different positions people take, according to 
the situation. Thus, even a former state employee speaking on behalf of a 
company close to state interests in one setting, can be sceptical of certain 
policies in another context. For example, one such employee commented:
I did not like the way this campaign was organised by our bureaucrats. [it 
was] arbitrarily decided that ten percent of my annual earnings (which was a 
lot at the time!) were to be spent on Rogun shares. The way it was worded it 
was clear that if one does not buy the required amount you might lose your 
job. As a patriot I would buy a couple of shares, but I was forced to buy out 
almost half of Rogun. I will tell you one thing, I can cover the walls of my 
apartment with the most expensive shares of Rogun – that’s how much I had 
to purchase!
Keeping such examples in mind helps us avoid reifying the 
‘state’/‘citizen’ divide.
š
The Soviet ‘hydraulic mission’ in the region was driven by the pursuit 
of two main goals – increase in the areas used for irrigated production of 
cotton, and generation of cheap hydro-energy. These two needs were not 
seen as being in competition, but rather as two sides of the same coin when 
the region was integrated as a single economic whole, enabling exchanges 
of water and energy across administrative borders of republics. Thus, 
both producing the ‘white gold’ of cotton and the ‘white coal’ of hydro- 
power were the main arguments for the construction of Nurek in the six-
ties.12 Nurek and Rogun were conceived together, as dual-use projects that 
would both help provide cheap energy for industry – indeed a whole new 
industrial complex grew out of Nurek in the South of Tajikistan, including 
a major aluminium plant and a chemical plant – and expanded cotton pro-
duction (Kalinovsky, 2013, pp. 209-217).
The review of press coverage and public relations material dealing with 
the period from the sixties to the present day reveals certain ‘high points’ in 
publicity campaigns, and trends within these high points. In the sixties, the 
12 Artemy Kalinovsky has detailed the sustained struggles between different experts in 
Tajikistan and Moscow over whether and how Nurek should be constructed in the post-war 
period (forthcoming 2016).
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coverage of the great construction sites of the Soviet Union (of which Nurek 
was but one) was prominent in the press and the literature (e.g. Gorba v, 
1964; Markov, 1962; Kharisov, 1961; Korobova, 1968; Sabirov, 1962). Such 
publications usually emphasised the construction of Nurek as demonstrative 
peoples of the Soviet East, a promethean triumph over the forces of nature 
lifting humanity out of darkness, ignorance and abject poverty.
Inspired by the early Soviet utopian visions of human reason and inge-
nuity eventually overcoming social injustice, ignorance, disease and even 
death, the hydraulic projects sought to transform nature alongside human 
nature and society. In a popular science and technology magazine, engineer 
river as “wild and unruly”13 and in need of taming:
Central Asian rivers often change their course. Especially in the spring and 
summer, when the glaciers melt, when they run with great speed carrying 
mud covering the ground and drying out in the sun, makes even the most 
fertile land barren. Such is Amu Darya. This is why its second name is 
 – meaning “wild.” It once played a trick on the builders of the 
Karakum channel – it turned right and departed by hundreds of meters from 
the head channel. But the channel followed, keeping the “wild” one on the 
This narrative of Soviet people’s conquest over the forces of nature, 
the taming of the primal energy through labour is traceable in the media 
 
and archives (Mirfozilov, 1978; Morozova, 1976; Taba nikov, 1980; 
Karatygina, 1982; Špunâkov, 1983). In the Soviet period, the public discourse 
on dams’ construction was permeated by the celebration of the technology 
and human labour transforming nature (Sabirov, 1962; Gorba ev, 1964; 
Morozova, 1976; Karatygina, 1982). A whole range of literature targeting 
various audiences, from illustrated children’s books and books for young 
adults, photo albums and brochures made the produced nature of the dams 
very visible and comprehensible (Markov, 1962; Daškevi  1974; Davidiânc 
& Tarasevi 1980; Makhonin, 1985). These publications describe in great 
detail the technology behind the construction of the dam, explaining both the 
13 Vakhš also literally means “unruly” or “turbulent.”
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science and the work that went into it. Another important aspect of Soviet 
discourses on dams was the genre of the ‘labour biographies’ of workers 
who distinguished themselves by excelling in highly skilled and arduous 
labour. Whole articles and books were dedicated to the heroes of socialist 
labour working as crane-operators, large truck drivers (belazists, from 
BelAZ – short for Belorussian Auto Factory’s giant trucks), brigadiers of the 
builders’ teams (e.g. Karatygina, 1982).14
Rogun is mentioned as the next great effort and achievement to come 
after Nurek in the same superlative language up until the late eighties, when 
perestroika and the policy of glasnost really came into force and journalists 
as well as the wider public started questioning certain aspects of the project, 
in particular the ecological and human costs of inundating the Vakhš valley 
(Suyarkulova, 2014).
-
cles expressed their principal opposition to the construction of Rogun or 
reservations about the reliability of the proposed technology. In the eighties, 
the locals who were expected to relocate to make room for Rogun reser-
voir opposed the policy. There was a short-lived debate around the issue of 
involuntary resettlement of people (Sodiqov, 2013). One interlocutor in 
Rogun town told us of local opposition to the dam project in this period, 
which is supported by archival and newspaper sources:
The Muisafeds [literally, ‘the white-haired,’ meaning ‘elders’] from the sur-
rounding villages travelled especially to Moscow to plead that the dam height 
be lowered, because [should the dam be constructed at the projected height] it 
the centre agreed to lower it, but then the Union ended and the war started… 
(Rogun, June 2014).
The concern about disturbing the peace of these cemeteries was echoed 
from Âkhš village in Rogun district, which was to be inundated. In her 
poetry she continuously refers to her home village as the “small mother-
land,” the sacred place of her mother’s grave that brings peace to her soul 
14 Indeed, some elite workers’ dynasties, though no longer celebrated media stars, continue 
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ancestors that became the lament of her later poetic protest to the disloca-
tion associated with the dam construction.
The most vocal critics of the project were using anticolonial rhetoric 
calling the resettlement policy the “tactic of an invader.” In 1988 an article 
appeared in Pravda entitled “The Dam,” which severely criticised the pro-
ject as “gigantomaniac” and made a case against the construction of the dam 
other aspects of the project, the author criticised the authorities for the plans 
to move people from Rogun to territories not suitable for accommodating 
the new settlers (Mirzorakhmatov, 2011). This article and others sparked 
serious discussions regarding the project, which resulted in the review of 
the project by a specially appointed committee of experts within Gosplan. 
A short note in Sel’skaâ izn’ [Village Life] newspaper reads:
Dushanbe. The Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and 
the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of Tajikistan adopted a decision 
to lower the height of the Rogun dam and consequently the upper line of 
that was to be inundated and will allow two thirds of the residents, who were 
preparing to resettle, to stay in the area. This measure was brought about by 
insistent demands of the population of the mountain regions around the HPP 
site and the association for culture and ecology (July 12, 1989).
If built as planned, the walls of Rogun will top the current Nurek world 
record at a height of 335 metres. Construction has been intermittent since 
1982, depending on available funds, commitment and the availability of 
materials and technical personnel. During the Tajik civil war, not only did 
construction cease – unsurprisingly 
infrastructure and tunnelling built before 1991. The town of Rogun and 
building site were also occupied by armed forces opposed to Rahmonov, 
causing fears that sabotage might endanger areas downriver. After the 
peace agreement in 1997, when Emomali Rahmon(ov) rose to power from 
the dominant faction, it took a decade before ambitious talk of construc-
tion regained momentum. There are currently two shifts of approximately 
1,000 workers serving at the construction site, a tenth of top-effort periods 
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in the eighties. Cost estimations vary enormously, with the World Bank 
recently projecting a cost that would top the country’s total yearly GDP 
(World Bank, 2014a). In June 2014, none of our respondents in Dushanbe, 
whether at ministries or water and energy institutes were willing to name 
a full cost estimate. Although Tajikistan has widely sought internation-
al investors, it is hampered by the reputation of endemic corruption, and 
the vociferous opposition of downstream countries Kazakhstan, and most 
especially, Uzbekistan.
According to the water specialists we interviewed, one of the main argu-
ments for constructing Rogun, is as a bulwark for saving Nurek’s generat-
ing capacity. Over the years, sediments accumulating in the reservoir have 
decreased the usable reservoir volume of Nurek by 50%. Rogun is to help 
reduce sediment deposits in Nurek, thus preserving its capacity for energy 
production.15 As a hydro-engineer and ecologist, one of the few experts 
to voice serious reservations about the desirability of constructing Rogun 
at the projected height, commented: “If we do not build Rogun, we will 
lose Nurek – no doubt about that” (interview in Dushanbe, June 2014). In 
this self-referential logic of hydrocracy, a new dam is necessary in order to 
resolve the sedimentation issue of a dam built earlier downstream.
The Tajik government has been extremely active in promoting Rogun, 
both towards domestic and for foreign audiences. After the project was 
resurrected in 2009, the late perestroika era criticism regarding Rogun was 
dismissed in the Tajik press as defamation and unreasonable protest on the 
part of the opposition leaders. Any objections thus became illegitimate, or 
even unpatriotic by association (this atmosphere was also supported by an 
interviewee, who has reservations about the project but is often criticised 
for his ‘unpatriotic’ stance). “Rogun is not only a source of light, but a 
national honour and dignity,” President Rahmon said in his address to the 
nation in January 2010 (UPI Energy, 2010). There are a number of new 
books and regular articles in the press vaunting the advantages of building 
Rogun, as well as public poster campaigns, often depicting President 
Rahmon alongside the dam.16
15 It should be noted here that silting will also affect the new Rogun dam. Over the course of 
World Bank, 2014a
16 Avesta.tj news website has an entire section dedicated to Rogun-related news and opinion 
pieces.
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In sum, water has come to be perceived in almost metaphysical terms. 
“Water is Life” is a common slogan, seen on billboards all over the country 
(see picture in Annex n°9). The Tajikistani government has consistently 
vaunted Rogun as a magic bullet solving Tajikistan’s economic woes, 
on the ‘enemy’ neighbour, Uzbekistan. “Rogun is our all – motherland, 
faith, future, unity”: this is how President Rahmon addressed the popula-
tion, calling on them to support the construction of the Rogun. According 
to him, such support would be “holy and noble.” As the President of the 
International Forum of Tajiks, he also called on all Tajiks in the world to 
contribute to the drive for the construction of this ‘palace of light’:
By building Rogun we secure the today and the tomorrow of Tajikistan. Rogun 
is the great leap forward in the industry and economy of the state; it means 
living and social welfare for each Tajik citizen. Support for Rogun is the duty 
of every Muslim of Tajikistan. We should all come together, tighten our belts 
undertaking (Avesta.tj, 2010).
These celebrations of dam prowess may also be considered in the context 
of Tajik government decisions in recent years to build the world’s biggest 
TALCO), largest khona (teahouse) and the biggest 
national library in Central Asia. One other important aspect of dam-building 
in Tajikistan is the TALCO aluminium factory, which purportedly consumes 
up to 40% of the electricity produced by Nurek, and is a major industrial 
into offshore accounts of the president’s extended family. In conversation 
with us, TALCO -
minium production, once Rogun was completed. It has to be said however, 
that the company is a clear rival to Tajik citizens’ needs in energy use, and 
receives preferential tariffs. A recent TALCO
both Nurek and Rogun to aluminium.
Government discourses towards international actors tend to highlight 
other facets, differentiated according to whether potential investors, or a 
‘green-light’ from powerful international organisations such as the World 
Bank are targeted. The Tajik government has recently even hired Washington 
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lobbyists (Trilling, 2014a).17 In addition, the government attempts to pro-
water management conferences, the latest being held in Dushanbe in 2015. 
Posters and slogans related to such conferences are a long-term feature of 
major city thoroughfares (see picture in Annex n°10).
-
tors since the World Bank released its economic, environmental and 
social impact assessments (World Bank, 2014a, 2014b). The report is 
primarily positive, highlighting the opposition of downstream countries 
as the main downside.
This last period of a ‘high point’ in propaganda campaign is characterised 
by reliance on either dry technical language or visual media such as posters, 
billboards and music videos. This changing relationship between the nature 
of the dominant media and the message they convey may be attributed to 
the fact that people can no longer afford books, but also to the fact that the 
state no longer subsidises the arts nearly as generously. But there is also a 
clear bifurcation in the tone and arguments directed at international opinion- 
makers and potential funders, in English, and the rhetoric chosen in commu-
nicating with Tajik citizens, in Tajik and Russian. In both kinds of rhetoric, 
there is a noticeable shift between Soviet-time and post-independence in 
discourse in terms of visibility of labour. The current media coverage of the 
dam tends to conceal the labour and the produced nature of the dam, often 
talking of water and its energy in almost metaphysical terms (e.g. Salimov, 
2002). These days only the technical experts are expected to possess the 
knowledge or take interest in how the dams are constructed. Through ren-
dering the labour and the produced-ness of the dams invisible, people are 
alienated from it. Nevertheless, new public forms of participation have been 
the sake of the Rogun project in the form of compulsory purchase of compa-
ny shares, as our TALCO interviewee noted.
The ‘magic bullet’ portrayal of Rogun facilitated a campaign of forced 
share-buying among citizens in 2009-2010. The majority of state employees, 
17 A variety of videos and websites promoting Rogun can be found online, such as “The Rogun 
Dam Project” [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IA2IPeK_hUI accessed 19.11.15].
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shares, sometimes to a value greater than an annual salary. This campaign 
coincided with a number of pop songs and video clips praising Rogun being 
released.18 The scheme caused such widespread debt among the population, 
Most residents, even in the president’s home town, do not believe they will 
ever see the value of their shares returned, and see it as a (to be expected) 
pp. 86-87). And yet, many citizens advocate the dam as a focus of hope and 
solution to stagnation and spiralling misery.
in our interviews with water and energy experts in the capital. Quite unsur-
prisingly, all our interlocutors working at government agencies expressed 
The strongest supporters agreed with the ‘magic bullet’ idea, and saw virtu- 
ally no draw-backs to the project. More modulated opinions saw Rogun as 
inevitable, or as the only possible option, despite various drawbacks. An 
important argument even for the most critical, was ‘saving’ Nurek. One of our 
respondents, who works at the research centre on water resource protection, 
-
ment of Tajikistan, even turned the issue of silting of the dam reservoirs into 
a positive phenomenon, telling us that it improves water quality and keeps 
18 See for example, Afzalšoh Šodiev’s song “Roghun” (2010). The brief description on 
Youtube accompanying the video reads: “Ma’nisaro” Afzalšoh Šodiev is one of the most 
popular contemporary folk singers in Tajikistan and among the Persian-speaking countries 
around the world. His songs are about motherland, patriotism, romance and love. His 
repertoire is based on the late Sherali’s poems and the work of other contemporary poets 
Sayyido, etc.). This particular song is devoted to construction of Rogun hydropower plant 
eve of New Year 2010 at Dusti Square in Dushanbe, Tajikistan [https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=MyAu9N1bxJw]. Another example is Qurbonali Rahmon’s song also 
called “Roghun” (2010) featuring the singer and two other vocalists at the construction 
site appearing next to welders and construction workers, singing “Roghun mesozem, bo 
ham mesozem” (We shall build Rogun, together we shall build) [https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=udfRxWJfJwM].
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all the good top soil residues within the republic’s territory, thus preventing it 
from being washed down into the territory of Uzbekistan (June 2014).
While the outward appearance is that of a universal and unequivocal 
support for Rogun, privately, people may voice their scepticism about 
whether the dam should or will ever be constructed. Thus, for instance, 
a woman working for an NGO shared her reservations regarding the dam 
project. She said that while she realised that this was necessary for the 
country’s development, it saddened her that several villages in the Rasht 
valley will be inundated and disappear, together with wildlife and the bio-
diversity of the plateau. She concluded by questioning the necessity of the 
dam, saying: “This is purely my subjective opinion, but I think that it would 
be better if Rašt remained intact. We already have a lot of GES,19 I think 
we have enough GES.” The most critical voices said they were opposed to 
Rogun, but declined offering further comment. 
The Human Rights Bureau (HRB) has closely documented the govern-
ment resettlement program of – to date – ca. 10,000 residents from the 
Rogun area. A further 32,000 removals are planned. The HRB has fairly 
successfully lobbied for the rights of displaced peoples, such as housing of 
at least equivalent value. Deputy director of HRB said that in their activities 
they avoided “political matters” and tried to establish working relations 
electricity and water supply (HRW, 2014, p. 1). Lobbying for their rights has 
likely been fairly successful because of the government’s desire for a clean 
about the opinions of citizens most directly affected by the dam – local 
Rogun residents and workers?
We spent several days in Rogun town, established to house dam 
workers during construction in the late seventies, on a mountain spur 
at 1,600 metres, overlooking the Vakhš valley and dam site. As many 
other planned industrial towns of Central Asia, the town attracted a multi- 
ethnic population and had a higher standard of living and housing than the 
19 Russian acronym for hydropower station (gidroèlektrostanciâ).
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surrounding area, with ambitious plans for parks and buildings, some of 
was repopulated slowly, mainly by Tajiks from other areas. In 2014, the 
population amounted to 39,886 people.
The main street of Rogun sports a brand new hukumat [town hall and 
district administration], a new glass-fronted bank and controlled entry to 
the dam site administration. Imaginative and carefully pastel-painted, late 
and shrubs. Away from the main street, or even within the apartment blocks 
however, the picture looks very different: damp apartments growing mould, 
often with no functioning central heating in the winter, apartment blocks 
half-built in the late Soviet period, but abandoned because of seismic shifts 
that cracked the concrete. We found the town administration hesitant to 
engage with our request for information on the town’s history, but residents 
very willing to talk about their connection (and often disconnection) to the 
dam site. Although none of the residents said so explicitly, we strongly 
felt that they wanted their story heard and told. Two informal local history 
museums, established at slightly different periods by two different volun-
teer curators, tell the story of town and district. The museum established by 
an older ethnic Russian lady in 1999 in an abandoned apartment, devotes 
the main section of the largest room to the establishment of dam and town. 
The museum creator, curator and care-taker, used to teach physics at 
š cascade of hydropower 
stations in Tekhnika Molod i [Technics of the youth], a popular Soviet 
science magazine. She kept a matchbox-sized diagram of the cascade and 
recreated it as a large poster in the museum with the help of a local artist. 
In her commentary on the exhibition she reiterated the Soviet discourse 
of “taming the wild rivers.” She also emphasised the exceptional status 
of the project, reminding us several times that it would be the “dam of the 
century,” the highest in the world, with the largest underground machine 
hall.20 In comparison, the second museum, later established in a very large 
classroom in the local school, only devoted about one square metre to the 
dam itself, instead focusing on the rich folkloric collections citizens had 
20 On similar alignments of personal investment and ‘speaking Bolshevik’ in the 21st century 
at Nurek, see Kalinovsky (2015).
Jeanne FÉAUX DE LA CROIX and Mohira SUYARKULOVA120
contributed. The two museum efforts could be said to present contrasting 
 
in the Soviet mould of dam-building as bringing progress, the second 
according the dam a much more minor role, and highlighting ethnic Tajik 
traditions instead. This reduced role of Rogun dam to Rogun town can also 
be related to hiring practices at the site. While respondents in Dushanbe 
often claimed that many people in Rogun worked at the dam, and that it 
was a relatively wealthy town, we found this far from accurate: perhaps 
an outdated, Soviet-era reputation. Rather, we found residents complaining 
that they were purposely kept in the dark about the dam-building process, 
and that the building companies preferred to bus in workers from other 
regions for two-week shifts. This meant that, as elsewhere in Tajikistan, a 
large proportion of (especially male) workers migrate from Rogun to work 
in Russia. Indeed, since the town was repopulated after the civil war, there 
are not that many workers from the era of Soviet dam-building still in resi-
dence, and able to offer relevant skills. In this sense, Rogun is no longer a 
‘dam-builders’ town. But even among skilled and well-paid workers, we 
encountered criticism and disappointment. We were, for example, intro-
duced to a former dam-worker who had been permanently incapacitated 
by a serious accident, received a miserly compensation but dared not – or 
found it futile – to attempt any legal recourse.
All my life I have worked at all major construction sites in the region and now 
I am treated like a dog. What they gave me as a compensation is a pittance, 
and when I went to Dushanbe (Hospital X), they told me I was healthy! Look 
at me, do I look healthy? (Rogun town, June 2014).
So how does this oscillating picture of state celebration, forced partici- 
pation, expert or more private critique – but also investment in Rogun – 
compare with dams built in Kyrgyzstan?
The Toktogul cascade of dams built on the Naryn river in the late Soviet 
period caused 35,000 residents to move from their homes. Moritz Florin 
the Kyrgyz and Uzbek SSR, Raš
secretary Usubaliev however, the Toktogul project came under increasing, 
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arguments were mostly raised in relation to lost land, memories and ways 
of life, rather than direct environmental impacts, or cost considerations. 
As with other proposed, but unrealised hydropower projects, republican 
interests of the Kyrgyz and Uzbek SSR increasingly fell apart, with Moscow 
view. It seems that as far back as the seventies, these diverging interests 
impacted local border and water management practices, fuelling local 
quarrels in some cases (Florin, 2015). M. Florin suggests that the Kyrgyz 
leadership used outspoken members of the intelligentsia to reinforce their 
viewpoint in Moscow. For example, after a visit to Toktogul in 1976, 
Bai iev argued:
received water for hundreds of thousands of hectares, and billions of kilowatt 
hours of electrical energy in exchange. This is no doubt very good. But then 
these 30,000 will never return... We should not let us be seduced by our power. 
We can really do anything; resettle seas, turn around rivers, move mountains 
out of our way. But today those who decide the fate of even the smallest piece 
of land have to learn to look at this piece not from a bird eyes perspective, 
not from the perspective of [...] modern airliner, but from the perspective of a 
space ship. Today this is the perspective that corresponds with the level of our 
thinking and our possibilities (Bai iev 1976, cited in Florin, 2015)
Unlike in Tajikistan, the Kambar Ata dams that were initiated at a simi-
lar period in the eighties, do not seem to have generated nearly as much 
public discussion or critique: perhaps because Rogun was going to displace 
been taken for the Toktogul dam in the seventies.
As in Tajikistan, electricity provision and pricing is an ongoing concern 
for the majority of citizens. This can partly be blamed on lack of invest-
ment in infrastructure, but corruption and mismanagement, for example in 
underhand sales of electricity abroad, are also an important factor. While 
there has been a general picture of increasing restrictions of free speech in 
of government attempts to control the public sphere, with varying degrees 
of impact. Although many Kyrgyzstanis feel as helpless in the face of 
widespread nepotism and corruption as Tajikistanis, it is rare for citizens to 
fear loudly voicing their political opinions in informal situations. Mitingi 
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[demonstrations] and even road blocks or periodic attempts to seize govern-
domestic politics periodically, and increasingly so since 2010, are the ope-
largest gold mine, operated since the early nineties by Centerra, a Canada-
based multinational.21 Kumtor hit the headlines in 1997, when a lorry 
carrying cyanide overturned in the local river, used as a water supply by 
neighbouring villages and emptying into holy lake Issyk-Kul. Public sus-
picion of the motives and safety of the mining are currently at an all-time 
high, with other, e.g. Chinese mining projects obstructed by road blocks (but 
also red tape) in other parts of the country (Gullette & Kalybekova, 2014). 
Although public discussion of environmental exploitation are dominated 
by these issues, the question of whether or not to build large dams hardly 
features. Nevertheless, electricity provision in Kyrgyzstan does seems to be 
partly driven by political considerations: the capital predictably gets better 
electricity provision, but so does the Naryn region: this is the coldest region 
that would suffer most from winter cuts. But it also happens to be the pro-
overthrow. As electricity prices were raised in summer 2014, there were 
also several, though very small, demonstrations in Naryn town. 
Kambar Ata 1 and 2, projects initiated in the late eighties, and relaunched 
by the otherwise unpopular president Bakiev, are probably the only high-
level Bakiev policy that has been continued after his overthrow in 2010. 
Though questions of funding and implementation periodically occupy the 
these large dams is not at issue. Before 2010, the interim president Roza 
Otunbaeva had been asking highly critical questions of the project under 
Bakiev, but once in power, she supported the project, as does the current 
government (Menga, 2013, pp. 137-138). One reason for this shift might 
be that in the political crisis and violence of summer 2010, when ethnic 
violence caused several hundred deaths and there were fears the country 
might break apart, the inauguration of Kambar Ata 2 (the smaller facility) 
on Independence Day was the only positive, potentially unifying piece 
21 This is one of the world’s biggest gold mines, and represented 33.4% of Kyrgyzstan’s 
export values in 2012 (Gullette, 2014, p. 17).
The Rogun Complex: Public Roles and Historic Experiences of Dam-Building 123
of news. In a fairly open ‘exchange’ of favours, Russia had at the time 
offered to fund the Kambar Ata project, in return for closing the Manas 
American airbase near Bishkek. Now the airbase has indeed been closed, it 
is not clear whether this funding will actually be forthcoming, and on what 
terms. Actual construction on the project is currently limited to building 
new pylon links across the country. On the other hand, a Kyrgyz-Russian 
joint venture has since 2013 begun building medium-scale hydropower 
stations on the uppermost reach of the Naryn river. The site is managed by 
RusHydro, investment comes from the Russian state. This means that until 
these investments are paid off, Russia will own not 50%, but approximately 
75% of the electricity produced at these sites. Despite repeated attempts, 
it has not been possible to view the actual contracts, and both regional 
administrators and residents are unclear about whether, for example, they 
about energy sales and pricing will be taken. The joint venture company 
itself claims there will be no preferential pricing or supply for the region 
of production. Nor does it offer any kind of social or training programs in 
the area of construction. Rather, regional administrators highlight that taxes 
from the dams will ease their regional budget, and that the dam sites will 
provide work (interview, June 2014).
However, in conversation with villagers, and from a Q & A session with 
dam management on local TV, it was evident that there have been (at the 
least) quite a few misunderstandings on this issue. The main concern local 
people raised in 2014 was indeed: employment opportunities, claiming that 
the company had promised 3,000 jobs to locals. On Naryn regional TV, the 
company representative, however, took care to emphasise that they were 
primarily looking for experts, such as engineers, with a number of years 
of experience. Such people are of course extremely scarce in surrounding 
villages that depend mainly on livestock. Anger over these disappointments 
had led to threats and theft of equipment at the dam site in 2014. In the 
local district town, this was rumoured to have been perpetrated by drun-
ken villagers. The village administration itself claimed that the theft had 
consequence, alcohol was temporarily banned in the nearest village to the 
dam, and the company refused to hire anyone from there. Possibly also in 
-
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pany, in an effort to improve relations with the population. Despite previous 
agreements on the acceptability of such a project with all parties concer-
ned (company, energy ministry, regional and local administration, national 
number of indirect tactics were used to frighten residents and to pressure 
the project team to leave. These included a policeman masquerading as 
an authoritative civilian, arguing that on the one hand “this village has no 
water problems…” but also that “people here are worried about showing 
22
Dam-building in Central Asia is part of an era of dam-building in Asia 
and Africa, at least partially sustained by a coming together of lobbies: 
-
tutions. We would like to note that neither such self-interested coalitions, 
nor the political use of dam-building is somehow a monopoly of doubtful 
democracies: the Tennessee River project, on which so many dam projects 
model themselves, was after all part of Roosevelt’s New Deal, a despe-
rate measure to try to overcome the Great Depression (D’Souza, 2013, 
pp. 62-63).23 However, in Europe and the US the era of big dams is over, 
and dam-decommissioning reduces their number every year.24
This chapter sought to draw out the way (successive) Tajikistani and 
Kyrgyzstani governments have interacted with their citizenry on the sub-
ject of big dams. Does it matter, that the two governments generally vary 
22 It should be noted that both in line with our participants’ interests, and because of the 
increasing sensitivity of the water and energy topic in the course of 2014, we had already 
the dam, i.e. the provision of drinking water, the role of irrigation, the current drought etc.
23 We would like to encourage research on further research questions
provision decisions around the world? Second, can we say that Rogun and the Naryn dam 
if it we were speaking about different kinds of building project, or not a building project but 
for example a series of government sponsored events, instead?
24 This is not to say that there are no contemporary infrastructure projects in these regions 
that equally ride rough-shod over local concerns.
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a lot in their approaches to control, participation and opposition? Or do 
we, in the end, have similar end results in decision-making over dams, 
united in Soviet historic origin and in end result? If so, what mechanisms 
might be contributing to such unexpected similarities? Before conducting 
research on dams on each side of the border in 2014, we had assumed that 
our research methods would be very much more constrained by political 
considerations in Tajikistan than in Kyrgyzstan. In effect, this turned out 
to be only partially true. In autumn 2014, the dam issue in both countries 
was hot enough to draw services’ interference, and radically curtailed both 
branches of investigation. It remains to be seen whether this will continue 
to be the case in Kyrgyzstan, or whether police interference and opaqueness 
of institutions will remain a constant in both settings.
Let us reiterate the series of similarities and contrasts that we have out-
lined: Nurek, and then Rogun, have always seemed to generate more hyper-
bole, but also hotter disputes with Uzbekistan, than dams in Kyrgyzstan. 
The hyperbole may be linked to the record-breaking nature of the Vakhš 
projects on the one hand, but also to the singular place Rogun has been 
given by the Tajik government, as a rhetorical means of generating patriotic 
means and government legitimacy – even towards international audiences. 
It seems the Tajikistani government utilises the technical ‘magic aura’ of 
Rogun much in the same sense as some Asian countries are continuously 
topping records in highest buildings, as daring displays of state power. In 
Kyrgyzstan meanwhile, the Naryn dams are treated far more as a matter-of- 
fact solution to an everyday problem: how to supply the country with 
enough energy. It seems to be this different approach to issues of sovereignty 
and disputed variations of patriotic ‘ownership’ that may feed the greater 
heat of Tajikistani-Uzbekistani water disputes, compared to Kyrgyzstani-
Uzbekistani water relations. It is not the case that patriotism is not currently 
also a strong current drawn on by the Kyrgyzstani government: but such 
exhortations are directed towards other issues and enemies: the international 
other ethnicities suspected of disloyalty. Should attention, for example by 
environmental NGO
Kumtor gold mine, the opposition, media and popular opinion might also 
ask what consequences growing dependency on Russia as an investor in 
dams and energy might spell, and whether such dependencies (whether they 
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are on a single country or organisation like the World Bank), are desirable. 
Russia has in fact backed off from funding the new Naryn dams in summer 
way of withdrawing from investment during a recession, but also as a way 
for Moscow to step back into the role of broker between different republican 
interests in managing Central Asian water and energy issues.
In both countries the political elites are likely to become the chief bene-
TALCO alu-
minium plant (Heathershaw, 2011; Trilling, 2014a, 2014b). Many less 
privileged citizens have experienced dispossession or have been pressured 
 – either directly by forced Rogun share purchases 
or indirectly through taxes in Kyrgyzstan. For yet other citizens, the dams 
present opportunities as a rare site of local work provision, and source of 
hope for a better future.
We can thus summarise that citizens, generally, have been more broadly 
affected by dam-building in the independence era in Tajikistan, than in 
Kyrgyzstan: residents of Dushanbe see images and slogans of Rogun on 
their daily commute, on TV, in bookshops. There have been very inter-
mittent recent propaganda equivalents from Bishkek, let alone in the 
Toktogul or Naryn region, where the dams are actually being built. In cor-
relation, opinions (and information) on Rogun are much more widespread 
in Tajikistan than for neighbouring Kyrgyzstanis. This is of course, also a 
legacy of the difference in Soviet-era discussions (very heated, with poli-
tical consequences for the decisions on Rogun – apparently quite low-key 
over Kambar Ata in Kyrgyzstan). Both a consequence and a reason for this 
heightened awareness is also, of course, the forced funding drive Tajikistani 
citizens were subjected to in 2009/2010.
Focusing more on the immediate experience of dam-building, in both 
cases we see a common legacy of the Soviet era dams as a model: despite 
the fraught process of building both Nurek and the Toktogul cascade, both 
their hydropower capacities in actually providing light and warmth, as well 
as proven success in bringing modern life to individuals and the country 
seem to fuel social acceptance for dam-building as a solution to energy 
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provision. Certainly in the Kyrgyzstani case, intellectuals’ rather polite cri-
tiques of the seventies seem to have been forgotten.
However, in both cases, when it comes to the actual process of dam-
building, rather than just the idea that ‘dams are a good thing for our 
country’, we found a sense of alienation widespread among citizens. This 
-
tions (on occasion consciously fuelled by government and company pro-
mises) of the construction sites providing well-paid work. Both states work 
to convince a shifting range of external actors (Moscow, the World Bank, 
Russia, Iran). Rogun however has been given a very different place as a 
national monument vouched for by President Rahmon, alongside other ele-
ments of Tajik state patriotism. The new Naryn dams, on the other hand, 
are usually handled as a sober means to an end, the Kumtor gold mines 
attracting patriotic fervour instead.
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Annexe 9 
Tunnel opening at Nurek Hpp with the slogan reading “Water is Life”  
in Tajik and English (Suyarkulova, August 2013)
Annexe 10 
Billboard from 2013, installed next to the Ministry of Water Resources  
and Melioration in Dushanbe, Tajikistan (Suyarkulova, June 2014)
